The Russian military escalation around Ukraine's Donbas: risks and scenarios for a revised EU policy by Minzarari, Dumitru
www.ssoar.info
The Russian military escalation around Ukraine's
Donbas: risks and scenarios for a revised EU policy
Minzarari, Dumitru
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Minzarari, D. (2021). The Russian military escalation around Ukraine's Donbas: risks and scenarios for a revised EU
policy. (SWP Comment, 27/2021). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale
Politik und Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2021C27
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.





NO. 27 APRIL 2021 Introduction 
The Russian Military Escalation around 
Ukraine’s Donbas 
Risks and Scenarios for a Revised EU Policy 
Dumitru Minzarari 
The ongoing military and political escalations in and around Donbas – including the 
increase in Russian military deployments near Ukraine’s borders – represent one of 
the most severe security crises in Europe since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 
2014. The patterns of Russian military deployments, the structure of forces, and the 
types of observed military hardware strongly suggest the risk of an offensive opera-
tion rather than an exercise. Given the existing political costs, that operation is likely 
to take indirect forms by using the cover of Russian military proxies in Donbas. This 
crisis represents both a major challenge and an opportunity for the European Union 
(EU) to conduct practical work on developing its strategic autonomy and offer leader-
ship in strengthening the security in its immediate neighbourhood. What should the 
EU do in practical terms to discourage further military escalation around Donbas, or 
at least increase the costs for such a development? 
 
By the end of March, the international pub-
lic was alarmed by reports of an ongoing 
military escalation in Ukraine’s Donbas. 
The New York Times wrote that an intensive 
exchange of artillery and machine-gun fire 
had occurred, killing four Ukrainian soldiers. 
Several high-profile political statements were 
issued. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr 
Zelensky, urged Germany and France – 
two participants of the Normandy Format 
talks – to make efforts to help preserve 
the ceasefire regime. Russia’s presidential 
spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, acknowl-
edged the increasing tension along the Con-
tact Line and expressed hope that this will 
not escalate into full-fledged fighting. Where-
as, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey 
Lavrov, issued a very strong statement, say-
ing that any attempt to renew the military 
conflict in Donbas “could destroy Ukraine”. 
Interestingly, the data on the nature and 
intensity of ceasefire violations, as reported 
by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), revealed an 
even higher spike in shelling incidents on 
12 March (around 200). However, it did not 
receive as much attention as the number 
of shelling incidents on 25 March (around 
150), which was the highest at the end of 
that month. 
This could be explained by differences in 
observation data – as collected by the OSCE 
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and the combatant sides – because OSCE 
observers do not have access to, nor a pres-
ence along, the whole Line of Contact. Most 
likely though, the general distress at the 
end of March was caused by a combination 
of factors, including the shelling incidents, 
the killing of Ukrainian soldiers, and, most 
importantly, the reports about Russian 
troops amassing near the Ukrainian border. 
Western Reactions 
In response to the failure of the Russian 
military to leave the border area with 
Ukraine after it finished drills on 23 March, 
the US European Command reportedly 
elevated its watch level to the highest one – 
indicating a potential imminent crisis. 
These concerns proved credible when mul-
tiple social media sources reported exten-
sive movements of Russian military hard-
ware from various military districts towards 
Ukraine and the occupied Crimea. The re-
ports were aggregated by the Conflict Intel-
ligence Team, which has been monitoring 
the recent movements of troops across 
Russia. More recently, the Russian military 
has been setting up military camps with 
field hospitals in the proximity of Ukraini-
an borders, which may be a sign of prepa-
ration for combat operations. The move-
ment of more than 10 amphibious and 
artillery boats from the Caspian to the Black 
Sea, “for military drills”, is another dis-
turbing step. 
This Russian military build-up around 
Ukrainian borders led to German Chancel-
lor Angela Merkel requesting that President 
Vladimir Putin withdraw troops to deesca-
late the emerging crisis. The situation is 
indeed perceived as critical, given that US 
President Joe Biden had earlier called Presi-
dent Zelensky to express his support for 
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity. NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten-
berg and the EU’s foreign policy chief, 
Josep Borrell, also reached out to Ukraine’s 
leadership, revealing the deep concerns 
in the West about Russian military move-
ments. 
Against the backdrop of these develop-
ments, various experts and observers have 
attempted to understand Russia’s actions 
and their desired outcomes. Some of the 
most frequently quoted interpretations 
have suggested that Russia’s actions could 
be posturing and a test by the Kremlin of 
the Biden administration; that the develop-
ments represent Russia’s coercive posturing 
in its attempt to pressure Ukraine and 
the West over the lack of progress in imple-
menting the Minsk II agreement; that 
Russia’s actions reveal its diplomatic pres-
sure against the EU as well as an attempt 
to decouple the United States from its Euro-
pean allies; or that Russia is likely trying 
to provoke Ukraine to escalate a military 
confrontation in Donbas, which it conse-
quently intends to use as a pretext to move 
in its “peacekeepers”. An often presented 
perspective of Russian experts indicates that 
the recent military escalations reveal Rus-
sia’s efforts to demonstrate that it would 
respond with force to any attempts to 
change the status quo in Donbas. 
Considering these and other expert 
views, there seems to be significant con-
vergence towards the idea that overt aggres-
sion of the Russian military against Ukraine 
is not very likely. In fact, there seems to be 
broad agreement that the Kremlin’s escala-
tory actions indicate an attempt by Russia 
to threaten the EU and the United States 
into pressing Ukraine to make concessions 
over the implementation of the 2015 Minsk 
documents. More precisely, that view im-
plies that Russia is implicitly blackmailing 
the West – to either push Ukraine’s 
authorities into giving special status to the 
Kremlin’s proxies in eastern Ukraine, or 
be faced with further military escalation. 
The Failure of Russia’s 
Political Tool 
There are a few important nuances that 
these assessments may be overlooking. By 
carefully examining the political context 
behind the escalation, the military postur-
ing, the deployment patterns of Russian 
 SWP Comment 27 
 April 2021 
 3 
forces, and their structure, one could bring 
more clarity about the sought outcomes. 
To start with, we shall consider that any 
military operation is simply a tool for 
advancing a specific political goal. 
However, the essential political objec-
tives of Russia in relation to the war in Don-
bas have not changed since the initiation 
of that armed conflict in 2014. In his recent 
videoconference with Chancellor Merkel 
and French President Emmanuel Macron, 
the Russian president insisted that the most 
important step is the establishment of a 
direct dialogue between Ukraine’s authori-
ties and the “Lugansk and Donetsk regions” 
on their special status. 
This is the same key message that Putin 
had advanced previously, in 2015. Earlier, 
in January of this year, the Russian foreign 
minister, Sergey Lavrov, threatened that 
Russia will change its approach towards 
Ukraine if France and Germany do not 
“bring to reason” Ukraine’s leadership and 
make it fulfil its obligations in line with 
the Minsk agreements. These steps seem to 
reveal Russia’s key goals in the negotiations 
over the war in Donbas. 
First, it is to provide legally binding 
and effective autonomy to its proxies in 
Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk regions. 
Then, it is to legally conceal its role as the 
main protagonist of the armed aggression 
in Ukraine’s Donbas by establishing formal 
direct talks between the Ukrainian govern-
ment and Moscow’s proxies in Donbas, 
which will solidify the “civil conflict” myth 
advanced by Russia. 
At the time of Lavrov’s statements in 
January, these Russian aims in Ukraine 
were implemented via two approaches: 
a military one – through the conflict 
mechanism in Donbas – and a political 
one. The political aim has been advanced 
particularly through the activities of the 
Ukrainian oligarch and politician Viktor 
Medvedchuk, who is a “personal friend” 
of Vladimir Putin and has been a driving 
political proxy that Russia has cultivated 
over the last few years in Ukraine. To close 
that channel of Russian influence, the 
Ukrainian authorities imposed sanctions 
against businesses and the media structures 
of Medvedchuk in February 2021, thus con-
siderably undermining his influence on 
Ukraine’s political processes. This has been 
a severe blow against Russian attempts 
to bring the Donbas war to a conclusion it 
prefers, via direct control over Ukraine’s 
domestic politics. The control was to be 
achieved by bringing Medvedchuk and his 
“Opposition Platform – For Life” political 
party into power. The logic of this political 
approach is similar to the idea that if you 
cannot conquer a fortress, you can corrupt 
it and erode its ability to defend itself. 
That approach basically copies Russia’s 
strategy in Moldova, where Moscow funded 
and supported the accession into power of 
another of its proxies – former Moldovan 
president Igor Dodon and his Party of 
Socialists. Russian authorities were very 
critical of sanctions against Medvedchuk, 
revealing his importance to the Kremlin’s 
political designs in Ukraine. For instance, 
Chairman of the Russian Security Council 
and former president Dmitry Medvedev 
expressed public dissatisfaction with the 
sanctions against Medvedchuk following 
their phone conversation. 
By eroding Medvedchuk’s growing in-
fluence in Ukraine, the Zelensky adminis-
tration significantly undermined Russia’s 
plans to legalise its military proxies in 
Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donbas regions in 
the near future. This would likely happen 
if Medvedchuk and his party were to come 
to power, which would then allow Russia to 
acquire effective influence over Ukraine’s 
domestic processes and politics. 
It does not mean that a Russian proxy 
in Ukraine needs to openly express pro-Rus-
sian beliefs. It can acquire public support 
by adopting the label of a “party of peace” 
and by exploiting the growing war fatigue 
of the average Ukrainian voter. Having 
failed in that political design, Russia reverted 
to the option of military threats. For in-
stance, Dmitry Peskov directly connected 
the two issues by stating that sanctions 
against Medvedchuk “could lead to a mili-
tary solution in Donbas”. It is within this 
wider political context that a spike in cease-
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fire violations in Donbas is emerging in par-
allel with an unprecedented concentration 
of Russian forces around Ukraine’s borders. 
The Viable Military Proxy Option 
It is difficult for policy analysts to accurately 
observe military and security-related activ-
ities. However, the earlier referred to reac-
tion of the US military’s European Com-
mand in response to the deployments of 
Russian military troops to Ukraine’s borders 
was very revealing. Given the US military’s 
intelligence capabilities, this suggests that 
the deployments are out of the ordinary, de-
spite the latest attempts by Russian author-
ities to claim routine military activities. 
Russia’s explanations are not credible for 
a number of reasons. Considerable evidence 
indicates that Russia is conducting an exten-
sive logistical operation to transport mili-
tary hardware in the direction of Ukraine 
from large distances, including from other 
military districts. It makes no sense to bring 
the military units of the Central Military 
District to the Western or Southern ones for 
routine exercises, or to move troops from 
the Western to the Southern Military Dis-
trict for the same purpose. As a rule, each 
military district conducts its training and 
verifications inside its designated geographic 
area, except during strategic exercises. 
Moreover, the scale of these movements is 
so large that Russia’s producers of agricul-
tural equipment have insufficient railway 
transportation capacity and complain that 
the Ministry of Defence has exhausted these 
for its own use. Finally, it is important to 
explore the nature of the deployment, which 
includes multiple launch rocket systems, 
self-propelled artillery, tanks and infantry 
fighting vehicles, fuel trucks, and mobile 
hospitals. This suggests preparations for 
offensive military activities, consistent with 
previous major engagements in Ukraine 
by Russia – such as the offensive against 
Debaltseve, for instance. 
Importantly, the deliveries of military 
hardware from the Central Military District 
– which covers parts of Siberia, where the 
Russian military stockpiles its old military 
equipment – would suggest that Russia 
is transporting older types of combat plat-
forms. Russia has upgraded the Western 
and Southern Military Districts with its 
most modern combat hardware. Russian 
military planners prefer not to use its 
modern combat platforms to equip its mili-
tary proxies in Ukraine’s Donbas, as this 
would easily reveal Moscow’s involvement, 
creating extra irritations between Russia 
and the West, and undermining Russia’s 
deniability efforts. Therefore, we are very 
likely observing an ongoing supply of Rus-
sian proxies in the Luhansk and Donetsk 
regions with older Soviet-made military 
hardware and munitions, suggesting the 
preparation for combat activities. 
Based on this, the existing assertions by 
many policy experts – that a Russian mili-
tary operation against Ukraine is unlikely – 
are not accurate. Although Russia’s political 
costs for overt military aggression against 
Ukraine are indeed very high – making 
this type of military action less feasible – 
it has an alternative course of action. Russia 
conducted a few military operations in 
Ukraine by disguising its regular troops as 
“Donetsk rebels”, moving Russian military 
troops and hardware across the Ukrainian 
border. A few of the most well-known cases 
are the August 2014 battle of Ilovaisk and 
the January–February 2015 fighting over 
Debaltseve, including several cases of Rus-
sian artillery strikes against Ukraine from 
Russian territory. 
Moreover, the prolonged combat opera-
tions that have been sustained by the 
“Donetsk rebels” during the last seven years 
would have been impossible without the 
constant resupply of munitions for rifles, 
artillery, fighting vehicles, and tanks, as 
well as fuel. The massive concentration of 
Russian troops at Ukraine’s borders makes 
it easier to conceal the movement of these 
military supplies into Ukraine’s Donbas. In 
fact, this is the most likely explanation for 
Russia’s choice to conduct the exercises and 
movements in the proximity of Ukraine’s 
borders. It provides cover for transporting 
its troops and munitions to the border area. 
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Russia then has the liberty of moving them 
across the more than 400 km segment of 
border shared with Ukraine, which is con-
trolled by Russian proxies in Donbas – the 
OSCE only monitors two border crossing 
points in the Gukovo area. 
Military Actions Revive the 
Political Option 
Therefore, the existing public discussions 
over the risks of a full-scale Russian inva-
sion in Ukraine are misleading and unhelp-
ful. They cannot contribute to the building 
of an effective strategy to discourage and 
counter Russian military involvement in 
Donbas. Russia can lead and conduct mili-
tary operations against Ukraine – includ-
ing for limited territorial conquest – by 
using the “civil war” cover and its armed 
proxies in eastern Ukraine. Any analysis of 
Russian military attacks against Ukraine 
should be conducted predominantly within 
the framework of this option. 
Discarding the risk of a Russian military 
operation against Ukraine based solely on 
the publicly reported numbers of Russian 
troops near Ukraine’s borders is also erro-
neous. For instance, the often seen refer-
ence to “additional 4,000 Russian troops” 
and the consequent conclusion that this 
number is not sufficient for offensive op-
erations is missing the point. The number is 
a conservative estimate by US intelligence 
and only provides a snapshot of the overall 
picture. It represents incomplete informa-
tion – a suggestion that is confirmed by 
the fact that the US military command in 
Europe elevated its watch level to the 
highest status. Moreover, what should not 
be ignored is that there are Russian troops 
in Donbas on permanent rotation. Other-
wise, it would be impossible to man much 
of the high-tech military equipment, the 
presence of which is routinely reported 
based on OSCE unmanned aerial vehicle 
observations in Donbas. Finally, numbers 
should be analysed in context. For instance, 
at one point during the August 2014 Ukrain-
ian offensive, Russia reportedly deployed 
some eight autonomous battalion tactical 
groups (a 6,000–7,000-strong force), with 
massive artillery support, which significantly 
changed the course of the operation. 
Moreover, Russian forces fighting on 
behalf of the “separatist republics” in Don-
bas would only have to concentrate a mili-
tary strike against a small front in Ukrain-
ian defences to break through. By gradually 
gaining limited terrain, Russia would inflict 
political costs on the incumbent Ukrainian 
authorities, who would lose popular sup-
port. This would also bring back Russia’s 
political option for Ukraine into play, by 
increasing the popularity of a political force 
that is sympathetic to Russia and marketed 
as a “party of peace”. 
Of course, this option has intermediate 
stages over a continuum of military options, 
in which Russia can attempt to obtain con-
cessions by threatening military escalation, 
gradually escalating violence in Donbas, 
and then further increasing the scope and 
intensity of its military actions there. What 
could the West do to assist Ukraine in 
managing and mitigating this security chal-
lenge? 
Strategic Context and 
Strategy Options 
As a defence alliance, NATO has concrete 
mechanisms and tools to deal with crises 
similar to the one developing around 
Ukraine’s Donbas. In fact, the Alliance has 
been engaging Ukraine in diverse defence 
cooperation programmes. However, NATO 
is less equipped to address the political 
dimension related to this crisis, which is 
of chief importance, since Ukraine is not 
a NATO member state. 
Under these challenging conditions, 
what would be the most effective policy 
options for the EU? Given its overall passive 
reaction to the war in Nagorno-Karabakh 
last year, the EU should use this crisis as an 
opportunity. It provides the EU with the 
chance to constructively and practically 
engage its strategic autonomy framework. It 
should do this by operating as a leader that 
SWP Comment 27 
April 2021 
6 
brings its member states, but also its part-
ners, around the table. This can be done by 
driving the agenda and designing a course 
of action to manage this crisis that has 
developed in its immediate neighbourhood. 
The emergence of revisionist regional 
powers has brought back into relevance and 
prominence the question of hard power in 
foreign policy. It proved effective in creat-
ing new facts on the ground, despite the 
political opposition of other states and the 
restrictions of international law. Therefore, 
the EU would benefit from learning how to 
effectively deal with countries that use hard 
power to bring changes that are detrimental 
to the EU’s interests. Because of the growing 
influence of hard power in international 
affairs, and given the logic of sunk costs 
that drives its economic lobby groups, the 
EU risks being forced to gradually accept 
the new changes imposed by Russia (and 
other similar actors), albeit tacitly. 
Given its past experience with the EU, 
Russia understands well this dynamic and 
is eager to exploit it. Hence, the EU needs to 
break down this vicious circle and change 
Russia’s way of thinking. The most optimal 
course of action for the EU, then, would be 
to communicate credibly that it is willing 
and capable of elevating the costs if Russia 
attempts to change the status quo through 
military means. 
Even if this fails in one instance – and 
it may be costly to implement – this ap-
proach will significantly increase the EU’s 
deterrence capability in future crises. The 
biggest challenge is the fact that, from the 
point of view of the Russian authorities, the 
collective EU is not credible in its commit-
ment to impose costs. To counter this, the 
EU leadership would have to cultivate and 
encourage “coalitions of the willing” among 
its member states, which would provide 
military assistance and perhaps the assur-
ance of defence support to Ukraine. To facili-
tate that, the EU could explore its individ-
ual members’ niche interests or use issue-
linkage strategies to help member states 
converge their interests on specific areas or 
policies. As an example, although France 
has limited policy interests related to the 
EU’s eastern flank, it has been deploying 
forces to the Baltic states as part of the 
NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). 
The issue-linking mechanism that encour-
aged French participation was, among 
others, the Estonian contribution to the 
French-led Operation Barkhane in Mali. The 
EU could explore that logic and apply it to 
compensate for the costs of some member 
states, thus encouraging their more active 
involvement in assisting Ukraine. For this 
purpose, the EU could offer its institutional 
framework as a coordination hub for such 
compensations. 
Outlook and Policy Options 
In practice, this can take different shapes 
and build on already existing platforms, 
such as the Baltic states’ efforts on defence 
assistance for Ukraine. The EU’s permanent 
structured cooperation mechanism could 
serve as the legal and operational channel 
for increased defence cooperation between 
selected EU member states and Ukraine, 
including on domains such as capabilities 
and operations. As another concrete option, 
article 44 of the Treaty on European Union 
presents the opportunity for the Council to 
launch an emergency operation of a mili-
tary nature just with the support of a group 
of willing member states. This tool is par-
ticularly useful for the EU should Russia 
decide to militarily escalate the ongoing 
crisis around Donbas, as it allows for a 
quicker reaction and response. 
It is very important for the EU to lead 
and coordinate this kind of support and 
engagement because this would allow it to 
develop and consolidate the appropriate 
mechanisms, procedures, and tools for its 
strategic autonomy process. Fortunately, 
the EU has recently approved a new Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy financial 
instrument – the European Peace Facility – 
which extends its practical abilities to assist 
Ukraine. With its €5 billion in funds over 
the next seven years (2021–2027), the Euro-
pean Peace Facility can cover the costs of 
EU military missions and operations; it can 
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also provide bilateral military and defence 
assistance, including via military equip-
ment, to any EU partner that faces major 
security challenges and that the EU decides 
to support. 
Of course, the institutional framework 
for such EU–Ukraine engagements is not 
yet fully developed. However, the EU could 
establish a bilateral partnership with Ukraine 
on defence and security policy along the 
lines of what was proposed recently by 
Portugal vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, and 
comparable to those in place with Norway 
and Canada. Under this partnership, if 
Ukraine were willing to accept, individual 
EU member states (or a group of states) 
could sign an agreement with Kyiv to 
deploy forces on a rotational basis to the 
Ukrainian–Belarus border, thereby assist-
ing Ukraine in covering this segment, 
similar to the work of the NATO EFP. This 
would allow Ukraine to free up additional 
troops for deployment to the Donbas Con-
tact Line, increasing its deterrence capacity 
against Russian military escalations. In a 
similar fashion, individual EU countries 
could assist Ukraine in the patrolling of its 
Black Sea shores on a rotational basis. 
Although these and some similar options 
may seem striking at first glance, they rep-
resent completely legitimate partnerships 
in accordance with international law and 
would increase the EU’s engagement in 
securing its neighbourhood though bilat-
eral assistance to Ukraine. Creativity may 
be required in order to build the concrete 
policy tools necessary for this to happen 
in the framework of the EU’s existing pro-
cedures. As an example of a creative and 
confident approach, the EU could design a 
different type of EU Common Security and 
Defence Policy mission to assist Ukraine in 
dealing with Russian-led military escalation 
in Donbas; or it could change the mandate 
of one of the existing missions in Ukraine 
(EU Advisory Mission or EU Border Assis-
tance Mission). Both a voiced intention and 
the development of these mechanisms would 
strengthen the EU’s ability to discourage 
military escalations by Russia, thereby sig-
nalling resolve and commitment. This type 
of partnership in defence and security areas 
between the EU and Ukraine would not be 
as threatening to Russia as Ukraine’s mem-
bership in NATO, it would receive less oppo-
sition from the more conservative Ukrain-
ian audience, and it would allow the EU to 
actually transition from sterile discussions 
about developing its strategic autonomy to 
concrete exercises that actually establish 
its related mechanisms, procedures, and 
capabilities. 
Another creative option for EU engage-
ment would be the exploration of an 
existing international legal framework. For 
instance, the EU could initiate and lead a 
follow-up stage of negotiations – in line 
with the Budapest Memorandum on Secu-
rity Assurances – and discuss concrete 
defence assistance for Ukraine in line with 
that agreement, attracting eventually the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada. This may look like a less traditional 
approach for the EU, but it encompasses its 
preference for legal solutions with the urge 
to develop a more robust strategic culture 
and capabilities. Besides, while the pre-
viously listed measures contributed to the 
“hardware” element of the EU’s strategic 
autonomy, this step would allow the EU to 
develop its related “software” – to initiate 
and lead international legal frameworks 
that consolidate the security in its neigh-
bourhood and the wider Eurasia region. 
Furthermore, the EU could engage 
Ukraine in negotiations that identify ways 
for providing as well as the stages of con-
crete defence assistance to Ukraine, the 
establishment of early warning and trigger 
mechanisms for crisis response, as well as 
a clear process for the involvement of guar-
antor states. In times of crisis escalation, 
this involvement may take a number of 
forms, including the deployment of an 
operation similar to the EU Monitoring 
Mission in Georgia that can discourage a 
further Russian military offensive. If this 
necessity arises, it will likely mean the 
withdrawal of Ukraine, the EU, and their 
transatlantic partners from the ongoing 
OSCE operation, which emerged as a frame-
work that unintentionally results in greatly 
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facilitating Russia’s existing interest to con-
trol the negotiations format over the war in 
Donbas. Because Russia favours the OSCE’s 
participation to any other organisation, due 
to its veto right at regular stages of the pro-
cess, an EU–Ukraine conditional agreement 
on replacing the OSCE operation due to an 
armed escalation triggered by Russia could 
in itself serve as a powerful deterrent against 
such undesired military developments. 
Although many risk-averse EU member 
states may be reluctant to discuss the poten-
tial and conditional replacement of the 
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 
with an EU mission, they need consider the 
alternatives, which are worse than what 
used to be the status quo. Only the concern 
of losing its current level of control over 
the negotiations process related to the 
armed conflict in Donbas could force Russia 
to check its temptation to conduct military 
escalations. 
The above suggestions are examples of 
creating real costs in response to Russia’s 
attempts to change the status quo via mili-
tary means. It is only by enacting clear 
mechanisms that would bind the EU to 
respond to Russia’s military actions – by 
tying its hands politically – that the Euro-
pean Union can credibly discourage mili-
tary escalation against Ukraine or other 
countries in the ex-Soviet space. 
The logic of hard power implies that an 
effective response would require a credible 
commitment by the EU to create costs, 
which would be possible by deploying its 
own hard power. And the emerging crisis 
around Ukraine’s Donbas region provides 
the EU with both challenges and opportu-
nities in this regard. 
Dr Dumitru Minzarari is Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at SWP. 
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